Boix (2003) Democracy and redistribution

In this seminal work he attempts to move forward from Lipset type modernization theories, which imply simply causal relationships between economic growth and democratization or lack of. Here he established 3 causal mechanisms for regime change:
1. Domestic distribution of economic asserts

2. The impact on regime type of fixed vs. mobile (fluid) asserts

3. Political asserts

 Argument:

·      When the cost of democracy is lower than the cost of repression we should expect transition to democratic rule. When asserts are mobile e.g. human capitol and elites know that citizens can move their assets outside the country then taxes  should be lower. Think the US taxes on the wealthy are relatively lower because people can move their asserts to China were they can make more for much less. Therefore in agrarian societies (most of the developing world) inequality is going to be much higher because elites can afford to use repression- for one they can not move their land (fixed assert- similar argument in Wood (2005) plantation owners in Mexico fought to keep their land because most of their wealth was invested in the land and they could not guarantee that once the peasants came to power they would redistribute all the wealth in a way that disadvantage the elites- think also the argument by Acemogulu and Robinson (2006) –elites will use repression if their asserts are under attack and they can not guarantee that they will still maintain some power with democracy—also literature on the absence of a middle class) thus these societies are more unequal.

·      Economic growth is necessary but not sufficient for economic rule.

Approach:

·      This is a very structuralist approach- he puts fourth a set of “preconditions” that make authoritarian breakdown more likely and democratization possible.

·      The distribution of wealth between the poor and the rich is the central battle of regime change---very economic…what happens if there is economic equality but political inequality oil states?

·      This is also a social choice approach-arguing that redistributive struggles are at the heart of societal regimes –he makes assumptions on choices and individual preferences-

o   1. Individuals want to maximize their utility

o   2. His main variables are asserts (fixed and mobile) and equality

o   In his model there is a lot of bargaining going on

o   Politicians are constantly weighing their options –thinking of what move is going to be the cheapest between:

§  Repression- squelch any uprising  (Think Mugabe clearly did this..after announcements of a possible million citizen march they put out military tanks in every city to induce fear). Medium inequality can also lead to repression as both sides have some semblance of control so they keep fighting it out.

§  Redistribution-in the face of coming uprising leaders can opt to redistribute both wealth and power in Bahrain and other ME countries leaders gave offers of money

§  Asserts_also influence responses in this way

·      If the rich/elites can move their asserts they might not see anything wrong with democracy but if they can’t think Libya (lots of oil money and ties that can’t be exported) then elites might opt for repression.

Criticism

1.   is class the only actor in the equation? Is it just about the rich versus poor or do other factors such as ideology, religion matter i.e. categorical inequalities

2.   in some cases conflict is ethnic vs. class but I guess he would argue that if ethnicity has been used to deny entrance into the economy or politics then it really does not matter. I am thinking the Chinese minority in China is really wealthy but has been strategically excluded from politics or Indians in Kenya. Therefore he should have done more to show that ethnicity does not matter.